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THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  FISHER. 
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H. Martin  Curtis 
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Civil  War  Papers, Command ry  of  Mass.V#l»1900. 


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THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT  FISHER 


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THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   FISHER 

BREVET    MAJOR   GENERAL    N.   MARTIN    CURTIS,  U.  S.V. 

General  Grant,  in  the  19th  Chapter  of  the  2d  Volume  of 

his  Personal  Memoirs,  refers  to  Fort   Fisher  in  the  following 

words  : 

"  Up  to  January,  1865,  the  enemy  occupied  Fort  Fisher,  at  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River  and  below  the  City  of  Wilmington.  This  port  was  of  immense 
importance  to  the  Confederates,  because  it  formed  their  principal  inlet  for  block- 
ade-runners, by  means  of  which  they  brought  in  from  abroad  such  supplies  and 
munitions  of  war  as  they  could  not  procure  at  home.  It  was  equally  important 
to  us  to  get  possession  of  it,  not  only  because  it  was  desirable  to  cut  off  their 
supplies  so  as  to  ensure  a  speedy  termination  of  the  war,  but  also  because  foreign 
governments,  particularly  the  British  government,  were  constantly  threatening 
that  unless  ours  could  maintain  the  blockade  off  that  coast  they  should  cease  to 
recognize  any  blockade.  For  these  reasons  I  determined,  with  the  concurrence 
of  the  Navy  Department,  in  December,  to  send  an  expedition  against  Fort  Fisher 
for  the  purpose  of  capturing  it." 

Thomas  E.  Taylor,  an  English  merchant,  one  of  the  most 
active  and  successful  blockade-runners  during  the  war,  says  in 
his  book,  "  Running  the  Blockade,"  page  139: 

"  That  morning  (in  Richmond,  Va.,  December,  1864)  I  had  an  appointment 
with  the  Commissary  General,  who  divulged  to  me  under  promise  of  secrecy  that 
Lee's  army  was  in  terrible  straits,  and  had  in  fact  rations  for  only  thirty  days. 
He  asked  me  if  I  could  help  him.  I  said  I  would  do  my  best,  and  after  some 
negotiations  he  undertook  to  pay  me  a  profit  of  350  per  cent  upon  any  provisions 
and  meat  I  could  bring  in  within  the  next  three  weeks.  .  .  .  Although  it  was  a 
hard  trip  it  paid  well,  as  we  had  on  board  coming  out  a  most  magnificent  cargo, 
a  great  deal  of  sea  island  cotton,  the  profits  upon  which  and  the  provisions  I  had 
taken  in  amounted  to  over  eighty-five  thousand  pounds  —  not  bad  work  for  about 
twenty  days." 

January  15th,  1865,  the  day  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher, 
he  wrote  from  Nassau  to  his  chiefs  in  Liverpool,  England : 
(p.  136,  same  vol.) : 

299 


<k 


300  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

"  Altogether  I  think  the  Confederate  government  is  going  to  the  bad,  and  if 
they  don't  take  care  the  Confederacy  will  go  too.  I  never  saw  things  look  so 
gloomy,  and  I  think  spring  will  finish  them  unless  they  make  a  change  for  the 
better.  Georgia  is  gone,  and  they  say  Sherman  is  going  to  seize  Branchville ;  if 
he  does  Charleston  and  Wilmington  will  be  done  —  and  if  Wilmington  goes  Lee 
has  to  evacuate  Richmond  and  retire  into  Tennessee.  He  told  me  the  other  day 
that  if  they  did  not  keep  Wilmington  they  could  not  save  Richmond.  They  nearly 
had  Fort  Fisher  —  they  were  within  sixty  yards  of  it  —  and  had  they  pushed  on 
as  they  ought  to  have  done  could  have  taken  it.  It  was  a  terrific  bombardment ; 
they  estimate  that  about  40,000  shells  were  sent  into  it.  Colonel  Lamb  behaved 
like  a  brick  — splendidly.  I  got  the  last  of  the  Whitworths  in,  and  they  are  now 
at  the  fort.  They  are  very  hard  up  for  food  in  the  field,  but  the  Banshee  has  this 
time  600  barrels  of  pork  and  1 500  boxes  of  meat  —  enough  to  feed  Lee's  army 
for  a  month." 

When  Colonel  Lamb  took  command  of  the  fort,  July  4th, 
1 862,  he  found  it  a  quadrilateral  work  with  six  guns,  flanked 
north  and  south  by  five  detached  batteries  carrying  eleven  guns, 
four  of  which  were  casemated.  Only  one  of  the  seventeen 
guns  was  of  modern  ordnance.  He  stated  that  the  frigate 
Minnesota  could  have  destroyed  the  works  and  driven  them  out 
in  a  few  hours.  During  his  occupation  of  the  fort  he  made  it 
the  largest  and  best  equipped  fortification  constructed  by  the 
Confederates,  as  shown  in  his  description  of  it  as  it  stood  before 
the  attack. 

At  the  land-face  of  Fort  Fisher,  five  miles  from  the  in- 
trenched camp  at  Sugar  Loaf,  the  peninsula  was  about  half  a 
mile  wide.  This  face  commenced  about  a  hundred  feet  from 
the  river  with  a  half  bastion,  and  extended  with  a  heavy  curtain 
to  a  full  bastion  on  the  ocean  side,  where  it  joined  the  sea-face, 
without  moat,  scarp  and  counterscarp.  The  outer  slope  was 
twenty  feet  high  from  the  berm  to  the  top  of  the  parapet,  at 
an  angle  of  45  °,  and  was  sodded  with  marsh  grass,  which  grew 
luxuriantly.  The  parapet  was  not  less  than  twenty-five  feet 
thick,  with  an  inclination  of  only  one  foot.  The  revetment  was 
five  feet  nine  inches  high  from  the  floor  of  the  gun-chambers, 
and  these  were  some  twelve  feet  or  more  from  the  interior 
plane.  The  guns  were  all  mounted  in  barbette,  on  Columbiad 
carriages  ;  there  was  not  a  single   casemated   gun  in  the   fort. 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT  FISHER  301 

Between  the  gun-chambers,  containing  one  or  two  guns  each 
(there  were  twenty  heavy  guns  on  the  land-face)  there  were 
heavy  traverses,  exceeding  in  size  any  known  to  engineers,  to 
protect  from  an  enfilading  fire.  They  extended  out  some 
twelve  feet  on  the  parapet  and  were  twelve  feet  or  more  in 
height  above  the  parapet  running  back  thirty  feet  or  more. 
The  gun-chambers  were  reached  from  the  rear  by  steps.  In 
each  traverse  was  an  alternate  magazine  or  bomb-proof,  the 
latter  ventilated  by  an  air-chamber.  Passageways  penetrated 
the  traverses  in  the  interior  of  the  work,  forming  additional 
bomb-proofs  for  the  reliefs  for  the  guns. 

The  sea-face  for  a  hundred  yards  from  the  northeast  bastion 
was  of  the  same  massive  character  as  the  land-face.  A  crescent 
battery  intended  for  four  guns  adjoined  this.  A  series  of  batter- 
ies extended  for  three-quarters  of  a  mile  along  the  sea,  connected 
by  an  infantry  curtain.  These  batteries  had  heavy  traverses  ten 
or  twelve  feet  high  above  the  top  of  the  parapets.  On  this  line 
was  a  bomb-proof  electric  battery  connected  with  a  system  of  sub- 
marine torpedoes.  Farther  along  a  mound  battery  sixty  feet  high 
was  erected,  with  two  heavy  guns,  which  had  a  plunging  fire  on  the 
channel ;  this  was  connected  with  the  battery  north  of  it  by  a 
light  curtain.  Following  the  line  of  the  works  it  was  one  mile 
from  the  angle  of  the  sea  and  land  faces  to  the  mound,  and  upon 
this  line  twenty-four  heavy  guns  were  mounted.  From  the 
mound  for  nearly  a  mile  to  the  end  of  the  point  was  a  level  sand 
plain  scarcely  three  feet  above  high  tide,  and  much  of  it  was  sub- 
merged during  gales.  At  this  point  was  Battery  Buchanan,  of 
four  guns,  in  the  shape  of  an  ellipse,  commanding  the  inlet,  its 
two  1 1 -inch  guns  covering  the  approach  by  land.  An  advanced 
redoubt  with  a  24-pounder  was  added  after  the  first  expedition. 
A  wharf  for  large  steamers  was  in  close  proximity  to  these  works. 
As  a  defence  against  infantry  there  was  a  system  of  sub- 
terra  torpedoes  extending  across  the  peninsula,  five  to  six  hun- 
dred feet  from  the  land-face,  and  so  disconnected  that  the  explo- 
sion of   one  would  not  affect  the  others  ;  inside  the  torpedoes, 


302  CIVIL   WAR   PAPERS 

about  fifty  feet  from  the  berm  of  the  work,  extending  from 
river  bank  to  sea-shore,  was  a  heavy  palisade  of  sharpened 
logs  nine  feet  high,  pierced  for  musketry.  There  was  a  redoubt 
guarding  the  sally-port,  from  which  two  Napoleons  were  run  out, 
as  occasion  required.  At  the  river  end  of  the  palisade  was  a 
deep  and  muddy  slough,  across  which  was  a  bridge,  over  which 
the  river  road  entered  the  fort.  Commanding  this  bridge  was  a 
Napoleon  gun.  There  were  three  mortars  in  rear  of  the  land- 
face. 

Colonel  Lamb  says  : 

"  Fort  Fisher  commanded  the  last  gateway  between  the  Confederate  States  and 
the  outside  world.  Its  capture  with  the  resulting  loss  of  all  the  Cape  Fear  River 
defences,  and  of  Wilmington,  the  great  importing  depot  of  the  South,  effectually 
ended  all  blockade  running.  Lee  sent  me  word  that  Fort  Fisher  must  be  held  or 
he  could  not  subsist  his  army." 

General  Butler  reported  at  8  p.m.,  December  27th,  to  General 
Grant,  his  return  to  Fortress  Monroe,  briefly  stating  the  oper- 
ations of  the  men  under  his  command,  and  his  reasons  for  with- 
drawing his  forces.  He  stated  that  all  but  about  three  hundred 
were  re-embarked  before  he  left  the  North  Carolina  coast,  and  that 
he  had  no  doubt  they  were  all  safely  off  by  that  time.  He  also 
said  that  he  would  go  up  to  see  General  Grant  the  next  morning. 

The  transports  returning  with  the  troops  (excepting  one  on 
which  was  about  one-quarter  of  Curtis's  brigade,  which  did  not 
return  until  after  the  second  expedition  sailed)  passed  the  capes 
and  anchored  in  Hampton  Roads  early  in  the  morning  of  De- 
cember 29th,  and  returned  to  their  camps  near  the  New  Mar- 
ket Road  on  the  30th  of  December. 

In  the  interval  between  the  return  of  the  first  expedition 
and  the  departure  of  the  second,  General  Grant  was  in  corre- 
spondence with  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  and  Admiral  Porter,  in  reference  to  the  failure 
of  the  first  expedition,  and  the  preparation  going  forward  to  re- 
new the  attack  upon  Fort  Fisher. 

On  January  2nd  General  Grant  requested  General  Butler  to 
send  Major  General  Terry  to  him  at  City  Point,  and  the  same 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT   FISHER  303 

day  issued  Special  Orders  No.  2,  Headquarters  Armies  of  the 
United  States,  directing  eight  thousand  infantry,  two  batteries 
of  artillery  without  horses,  with  four  days'  cooked  rations  in  hav- 
ersacks, to  be  got  in  immediate  readiness  to  embark  on  trans- 
ports, with  orders  to  report  to  Major  General  W.  T.  Sherman, 
at  Savannah,  Ga.  ;  that  the  troops  and  artillery  of  the  late  ex- 
pedition against  Wilmington,  being  experienced  in  embarking 
and  debarking,  should  be  selected,  and  to  make  up  the  balance 
of  the  eight  thousand,  good  and  tried  soldiers  of  the  Second 
Brigade,  First  Division,  Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  should  be 
taken.  Brevet  Major  General  A.  H.  Terry,  U.  S.  Vols.,  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  these  forces,  and  directed  that  every 
practicable  precaution  should  be  observed  to  prevent  information 
of  any  movement  of  troops  getting  to  the  enemy. 

On  January  2nd  General  Grant  gave  General  Terry  written 
instructions  to  renew  the  attack  on  Fort  Fisher,  with  details  for 
his  co-operation  with  Admiral  Porter. 

On  January  4th  Lieutenant  Colonel  C.  B.  Comstock,  Aide- 
de-camp,  was  directed  to  report  to  General  Terry,  and  accom- 
pany him  as  chief  engineer  of  the  expedition  under  his  command. 

January  4th,  on  receipt  of  a  letter  from  Admiral  Porter, 
General  Grant  gave  General  Terry  additional  instructions  gov- 
erning his  action  after  joining  Admiral  Porter's  fleet.  When  the 
troops  went  down  the  James  River,  General  Grant  accompanied 
General  Terry  to  Fortress  Monroe,  and  gave  such  verbal  in- 
structions as  he  deemed  necessary. 

January  4th,  1865,  five  days  after  returning  from  the  first 
expedition,  the  First  Brigade  broke  camp,  marched  in  a  heavy 
snow-storm  to  Bermuda  Landing;  and  bivouacked  for  the  night. 

The  next  morning,  General  Adelbert  Ames,  commanding 
Second  Division,  Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  directed  me  to 
embark  my  brigade  on  two  river  steamers,  proceed  to  Hampton 
Roads,  transfer  my  command  to  the  steamship  Atlantic  and 
to  reserve  rooms  on  board  the  ship  for  himself  and  staff  ;  and 
he  especially  directed  that  neither  myself  nor  any  member   of 


304  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

my  command  should  leave  the  ship  after  boarding  it.  The  trip 
down  the  James  River,  and  the  transfer  of  the  troops  to  the 
Atlantic  were  made  before  sundown.  Before  dark  all  the  division 
officers,  except  General  Ames  and  his  aide,  Captain  Henry  C. 
Lockwood,  came  on  board,  and  reported  that  General  Ames  and 
Captain  Lockwood  would  soon  join  us.  Two  rooms  had  been 
reserved  for  General  Ames,  and  one  for  each  of  his  staff. 

About  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening,  information  reached  us 
that  Ames's  division,  Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  Paine's 
division,  Twenty-fifth  Corps  (Colored),  J.  C.  Abbott's  Second 
Brigade,  First  Division,  Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  and  two 
batteries  of  artillery  were  on  transports  in  Hampton  Roads. 

At  five  minutes  after  twelve  o'clock  that  night  Captain  Alger- 
non E.  Smith,  117th  New  York,  aide  to  General  A.  H.  Terry, 
brought  to  my  state-room  a  sealed  envelope  addressed  "  To  the 
Senior  Officer  on  Board  the  Atlantic"  and  asked  me  to  take  and 
receipt  for  it.  This  I  declined  to  do,  informing  him  that  General 
Ames  was  the  senior  officer  on  board,  and  the  proper  person  to 
receive  it.  He  left,  but  soon  returned  with  one  of  the  division 
staff,  who  reported  that  General  Ames  was  not  at  that  time  on 
board.  I  then  receipted  for  the  despatch,  and  after  reading  it  to 
the  division  staff  officer,  requested  him  to  acquaint  General 
Ames  with  its  contents  as  soon  as  he  could  do  so.  The  orders 
addressed  "To  the  Senior  Officer  on  Board  the  Atlantic"  and 
the  sealed  orders  addressed  "To  be  opened  off  Cape  Henry," 
read  as  follows  : 

Headquarters  Expeditionary  Forces, 
General  Orders,  )  January  3,  1865. 

No.  2.  J 

The  vessels  containing  the  troops  of  this  expedition  will  leave  Hampton  Roads 
precisely  at  4  a.m.  to-morrow.  As  far  as  possible  the  vessels  containing  the  troops 
of  each  division  will  keep  together,  and  the  whole  fleet  will  follow  the  flagship, 
which  will  carry  red,  white,  and  green  lights  at  the  masthead.  They  will  pass  out 
between  the  capes,  and  when  off  Cape  Henry  the  sealed  orders  which  are  furnished 
to  the  commanding  officer  on  each  transport  will  be  opened.  The  speed  of  the 
transports  will  be  as  nearly  as  possible  eight  knots  per  hour. 

By  order  of  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen.  A.  H.  Terry  : 
A.  Terry,  Captain,  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General." 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   FORT    FISHER  305 

Headquarters  Expeditionary  Forces, 
January j,  1865. 
Sealed  Orders, 

Commanding  Officer  of  Troops, 

On  Board  of  U.  S.  Transport  Atlantic  : 
Sir: 

The  transport  fleet  will  rendezvous  twenty-five  miles  off    Beaufort,  N.C. 
You  will  immediately  proceed  to  that  point  and  report  to  the  senior  officer  of  the 
expedition  present  at  the  time  of  your  arrival. 
You  will  then  await  further  orders. 

By  order  of  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen.  A.  H.  Terry  : 

A.  Terry,  Captain,  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

I  sent  word  to  Captain  Gray,  commanding  the  ship  to  weigh 
anchor  and  be  ready  to  sail  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning.  I 
went  on  deck  at  3  a.m.,  and  found  the  men  weighing  anchor ; 
but  the  ship  waited  for  its  position  in  the  line  until  after  day- 
light, and  then  passed  out  between  the  capes.  While  sailing  out 
breakfast  was  served  to  the  officers  in  the  cabin.  Before  taking 
seats  at  the  table  I  requested  Captain  Charles  A.  Carleton,  acting 
assistant  adjutant  general  on  division  staff,  to  invite  General  Ames 
to  join  us.  He  replied,  "General  Ames  did  not  come  on  board 
until  late,  and  will  not  breakfast  for  several  hours."  Before  the 
officers  left  the  table  Captain  Gray  was  called  on  deck.  He  soon 
returned  and  reported  that  the  ship  was  off  Cape  Henry,  and 
asked  for  further  orders.  I  handed  to  Captain  Carleton  the 
sailing  orders,  as  well  as  the  sealed  orders,  "To  be  opened 
when  off  Cape  Henry,"  and  requested  him  to  give  them  to 
General  Ames.  At  first  Captain  Carleton  declined  to  do  so, 
saying  he  did  not  wish  to  disturb  General  Ames,  and  said  that  I 
should  open  the  envelope  and  attend  to  all  matters  of  detail 
while  on  shipboard,  as  Colonel  Bell  had  done  on  the  first  ex- 
pedition. I  replied  that  I  should  not  assume  any  of  the  duties 
of  the  division  commander  until  directed  by  him  to  do  so,  and 
that  if  he  declined  to  take  the  orders  to  General  Ames  I  would 
send  one  of  my  own  staff.  Thereupon  Captain  Carleton  took  the 
orders  to  the  state-room  in  which  General  Ames's  baggage  had 
been  placed,  but  soon  returned  to  the  cabin  and  reported  that 
General  Ames  was  not  on  board  the  ship. 


306  CIVIL   WAR    PAPERS 

During  the  second  day  after  the  arrival  of  the  division  at  the 
rendezvous  off  Beaufort,  N.  C,  General  Ames  and  his  personal 
aide,  Captain  Lockwood,  came  on  board  the  Atlantic  from  a 
hospital  ship  which  had  sailed  from  Fortress  Monroe  the  day- 
following  the  departure  of  the  expedition.  General  Ames  then 
charged  General  Curtis  with  "  sailing  with  his  division  for  the 
purpose  of  commanding  it,"  and  used  offensive  words,  which 
were  promptly  resented  and  their  retraction  demanded.  Follow- 
ing this  unhappy  and  uncalled  for  incident  the  intercourse 
between  these  officers  was  limited  to  the  strictest  requirements 
of  official  duty. 

After  the  sailing  of  the  troops  above  mentioned,  Brevet 
Brigadier  General  H.  L.  Abbott  sailed  from  Fortress  Monroe, 
on  the  7th  of  January,  with  a  siege  train  of  twenty  30-pounder 
and  four  100-pounder  Parrott  guns,  twenty  Coehorn  mortars, 
three  companies  of  the  1st  Connecticut  Heavy  Artillery,  and 
two  companies  of  the  15th  New  York  Engineers.  This  addi- 
tional force  joined  us  at  the  rendezvous  one  day  before  the 
landing. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  Friday,  January  13th,  the  vessels 
of  Admiral  Porter's  squadron  moved  into  position  before  Fort 
Fisher  and  opened  a  vigorous  bombardment  of  the  fort,  which  con- 
tinued without  cessation  until  its  capture.  About  eight  o'clock 
a.m.  a  division  of  light  draught  naval  vessels  was  detached  from 
the  squadron  to  cover  the  landing  of  the  troops,  which  was  com- 
pleted at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  together  with  extra 
rations,  ammunition  and  intrenching  tools.  The  landing  was 
made  through  a  heavy  surf  in  which  officers,  men,  provisions  in 
haversacks,  and  ammunition  in  boxes  were  thoroughly  soaked. 

A  line  established  across  the  peninsula  in  the  early  morning 
was  soon  abandoned  for  a  second  line,  a  mile  farther  south,  on 
which  breastworks  extending  from  the  beach  to  the  Cape  Fear 
River  were  thrown  up  during  the  night  and  completed  at  eight 
o'clock  the  next  morning,  when  the  troops  of  General  Ames's 
division  were  withdrawn  from  the  line.     General  Paine's  divis- 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT  FISHER  307 

ion  and  Abbott's  brigade  (under  command  of  General  Paine) 
were  left  to  defend  it  if  attacked  by  the  enemy,  then  in  large 
force  at  Sugar  Loaf,  two  and  a  half  miles  north.  The  maintain- 
ing of  this  line  was  of  vital  importance  —  a  failure  to  do  so 
would  have  caused  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  before  the 
fort,  to  reinforce  the  line.  General  Terry  was  justified,  in  view 
of  the  past  services  of  the  troops  under  Generals  Paine  and 
Abbott,  in  leaving  it  in  their  charge.  The  regiments  of 
Abbott's  brigade  were  first  organized  under  General  Terry,  and 
he  always  fondly  referred  to  it  as  "  his  old  brigade."  They  were 
prepared  to  make  a  stubborn  defence,  but  the  mildness  of 
General  Bragg's  demonstrations  did  not  rise  to  the  dignity  of  an 
attack  at  any  time.  Not  only  did  he  not,  throughout  the 
day,  force  back  the  line  ;  his  fire  did  not  wound  a  single  Union 
soldier. 

For  the  third  time  since  he  rejoined  the  expedition,  General 
Ames  now  requested  General  Terry  to  promise  that  he  would 
not  designate  General  Curtis  for  any  special  duty,  and,  failing 
to  obtain  assurance  that  his  request  would  be  complied  with, 
stated  to  General  Terry  that  he  would  not  be  responsible  for 
the  success  of  any  movement  with  which  General  Curtis  was 
charged.  Thereupon  General  Terry  answered  :  "  I  have  known 
General  Curtis  for  nearly  two  years,  and  have  perfect  confidence 
in  his  ability  and  fidelity.  I  will  relieve  him  from  your  com- 
mand, and  direct  him  to  report  to  me  for  orders."  Immediately 
after  this  General  Terry  informed  me  that  from  that  time  I 
should  receive  all  orders  from  him  direct.  A  brief  statement 
of  this  incident  is  made  to  give  a  better  understanding  of 
subsequent  events. 

Soon  after  being  relieved  from  General  Ames's  command  my 
brigade  accompanied  General  Terry  and  Colonel  Comstock, 
Aide  to  General  Grant,  to  Battery  Holland,  below  Craig's  Land- 
ing, where  a  small  steamer,  loaded  with  forage  and  ammunition, 
was  captured.  While  marching  down  a  shell  from  the  rebel 
gunboat     Chickamauga,    lying   in    the    Cape   Fear    River,  ex- 


308  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

ploded  near  the  head  of  the  column,  seriously  wounding  Captain 
J.  H.  Reeve,  commanding  the  3rd  New  York,  and  three  men 
of  the  brigade. 

A  skirmish  line  was  sent  forward  from  Battery  Holland, 
under  cover  of  which  General  Terry,  Colonel  Comstock  and 
myself  went  along  the  sand  dunes  near  the  river  to  within  six 
hundred  yards  of  the  fort.  After  completing  his  observations 
General  Terry  asked,  "Do  you  think  the  fort  can  be  successfully 
assaulted  with  the  force  I  can  spare  from  the  line  established 
last  night,  the  holding  of  which  is  of  the  first  importance  ?  "  I 
replied  that  I  believed  the  three  brigades  already  withdrawn 
from  the  line  could  carry  the  fort  by  an  assault  if  the  disposi- 
tions were  properly  made,  and  if  the  Navy  should  support  the 
troops  from  start  to  finish.  He  said,  "  It  has  been  definitely 
determined  that  in  case  an  assault  is  made  you  will  make  it. 
I  will  see  Admiral  Porter  this  evening,  and  we  will  then  decide 
what  course  to  pursue." 

General  Terry  directed  me  to  remain  near  the  fort  if  I  could 
do  so  safely,  or  to  retire  to  the  reserves  near  the  breastworks 
thrown  up  the  night  before,  where  he  could  be  found  to  receive 
reports  of  any  incidents  which  I  might  think  it  important  for 
him  to  know.  He  then  returned,  with  Colonel  Comstock,  to 
the  reserves. 

From  a  sand  dune  on  the  right  of  my  skirmish  line  I  took  a 
survey  of  the  ground  in  front  of  the  parapet,  and  determined  to 
throw  up  breastworks  to  protect  the  assaulting  party.  On 
account  of  the  conformation  I  decided  to  construct  these  lines 
at  an  angle  to  the  curtain,  the  left  flanks  to  be  fifty  yards  nearer 
the  fort  than  the  right  flanks.  There  was  marshy  ground  in 
front  of  the  west  half  of  the  parapet,  but  I  preferred  to  march 
through  it  rather  than  go  to  the  eastward  over  dry  ground, 
although  the  west  end  of  the  parapet  was  higher  than  the  east 
end,  as  the  low  ground  in  front  made  it  easier  to  get  under  the 
plane  of  fire  than  at  the  east  end,  where  the  surface  was  higher, 
and  served  as  a    natural  glacis.     Because  of   this,  when  the 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT  FISHER  309 

assault  finally  came  to  be  made,  the  naval  column  was  kept 
under  fire  longer  than  were  the  troops  assaulting  on  the  left 
end  of  the  parapet. 

As  soon  as  it  was  dark  a  skirmish  line  was  deployed  at  five 
paces,  the  front  rank  carrying  muskets,  the  rear  shovels,  and 
advanced  to  the  place  selected  for  the  first  line.  Here  the  men 
in  the  rear  line  proceeded  to  throw  up  enough  sand  to  protect  a 
man  lying  on  his  face,  while  the  line  with  muskets  advanced 
twenty  paces  beyond  the  men  with  shovels.  In  the  drift  sand 
the  work  was  quickly  done.  Then  the  man  with  the  shovel 
went  forward  and  gave  it  to  the  picket,  from  whom  he  took  his 
musket  and  marched  forward  twenty  paces,  while  the  former 
picket  threw  up  the  sand  where  he  stood  ;  and  so  the  lines 
went  forward,  each  man  exchanging  gun  for  shovel.  In  this 
manner  four  lines  of  breastworks  were  laid  out,  the  last  being 
under  the  plane  of  fire.  Details  were  made  to  connect  these 
"  Gopher  Holes,"  as  the  men  called  them,  thus  making  con- 
tinuous lines.  About  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  yards  from 
the  parapet  a  higher  and  heavier  breastwork  was  thrown  up  to 
protect  a  party  of  sharpshooters  ;  and  forty  men,  selected  on 
account  of  their  skill  as  marksmen,  were  immediately  sent  to 
occupy  it.  They  had  orders  to  remain  until  the  next  night,  or 
until  an  assault  should  be  made,  in  which  case  they  were 
instructed  to  join  the  first  line  and  go  to  the  fort.  In  the 
meantime  they  were  to  prevent  the  loading  of  the  Columbiads 
on  the  parapet.  The  work  was  completed  before  dawn,  and 
the  tired  troops  of  the  First  Brigade  turned  in  for  a  well-earned 
rest.  Many  of  those  who  slept  on  the  sands  of  Federal  Point 
the  night  preceding  the  battle  of  January  15th,  friends  and 
foes  alike,  will,  from  causes  incident  to  the  service,  remember 
that  night,  with  all  its  disagreeable  features,  as  one  which 
afforded  them  sweeter  and  more  restful  slumber  than  they  have 
since  obtained  on  the  softest  couch. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15  th  General  Terry,  with  Colonel 
Comstock,  came  to  Battery  Holland,  and  informed  me  that  it 


310  CIVIL  WAR  PAPERS 

had  been  agreed  between  Admiral  Porter  and  himself  that  the 
three  brigades  of  the  Second  Division  should  attack  the  west 
end  of  the  parapet,  while  sixteen  hundred  sailors  and  four 
hundred  marines  would  attack  the  east  end  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  He  then  asked,  "  What  have  you  done  or  dis- 
covered during  the  night  ?  "  He  was  told  about  the  rifle  pits 
and  their  use  when  advancing  on  the  fort,  and  the  stationing  of 
men  under  the  plane  of  fire  to  keep  the  cannoneers  from  loading 
the  Columbiads  when  the  assaulting  forces  should  take  position 
preliminary  to  the  final  rush.  He  approved  the  work,  and  later 
sent  forward  sixty  men  of  the  13th  Indiana  (Third  Brigade) 
with  repeating  rifles,  to  join  the  sharpshooters.  They  went 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Samuel  M.  Zent,  and 
they  performed  most  valuable  service. 

General  Terry  said  to  me,  "  You  stated  yesterday  that  an 
assault  would  be  successful  '  if  the  dispositions  were  properly 
made.'  Your  brigade  is  to  lead,  and  I  should  like  to  know 
your  views  as  to  the  formation."  I  replied  that  I  wished  to 
charge  in  line,  brigade  front,  make  successive  advances  from  one 
rifle  pit  to  the  next,  the  final  rush  not  to  be  made  until  we  were 
as  near  the  fort  as  we  could  get  without  drawing  the  infantry 
fire,  and  that  our  movements  in  this  particular  would  be  gov- 
erned by  the  action  of  the  enemy  in  coming  to  the  parapet ;  that 
when  his  infantry  came  up  we  would  wait  behind  our  newly  made 
rifle  pits  until  the  Navy  pounded  them  down ;  when  they  were 
down  we  would  go  forward  to  the  next  line ;  when  they  came  to 
the  parapet  again  we  would  again  lie  down  until  they  were 
driven  back  ;  and  when  they  should  refuse  to  leave  the  parapet 
we  would  make  the  final  rush  and  get  under  the  plane  of  fire 
before  the  enemy  could  deliver  a  second  volley. 

General  Terry  said,  "  Don't  you  want  to  strike  them  in 
column  with  a  hammer-head?"  I  replied,  "After  I  get  under 
the  plane  of  fire  I  will  ;  but  before  that  the  thinner  the  line 
the  better.  The  troops  will  be  in  column  when  they  get  to  the 
parapet.     The  right  regiment  will  go  straight  to  the  right  of  the 


THE   CAPTURE    OF    FORT   FISHER  3  1 1 

left  salient,  the  three  other  regiments  will  oblique  to  the  right 
and  strike  the  fort  at  the  same  place,  and  so  reduce  the  front  to 
one-third  of  what  it  will  be  at  the  start.  We  will  pass  the 
stockade  and  mount  the  parapet,  and  if  we  cannot  get  in,  send 
a  brigade  to  push  us  in."  The  subject  was  fully  discussed,  and 
after  Colonel  Comstock  had  given  the  plan  his  approval  General 
Terry  accepted  it.  He  thus  became  responsible  for  the  plan, 
and  ordered  its  execution. 

I  said,  "  General  Terry,  the  final  rush  will  be  made  when 
you  see  me  rise  in  the  middle  of  the  line  and  hear  me  call  aloud. 
Soon  after  you  will  see  the  First  Brigade  go  through  the  stock- 
ade and  up  the  parapet  ;  then  send  Pennypacker's  brigade."  He 
replied,  "  With  the  men  of  your  brigade  on  the  parapet  I  shall 
feel  certain  of  success.     A  lodgment  there  assures  victory." 

About  noon  General  Ames  came  to  the  front  with  Bell's 
and  Pennypacker's  brigades,  and  halted,  them  in  rear  of  my 
brigade. 

A  little  time  before  advancing  to  the  line  from  which  the 
start  was  to  be  made,  a  naval  officer,  Lieutenant  Porter,  I 
think,  came  to  me  and  said,  "  General  Terry  informs  me  that 
your  brigade  is  to  lead  in  the  assault,  and  I  desire  to  be  informed 
of  your  plans,  so  that  the  sailors  and  marines  on  the  beach  may 
move  at  the  same  time  you  do."  I  told  him  of  the  plans  for  a 
gradual  approach,  and  that  the  final  rush  would  be  made  when 
the  garrison  remained  on  the  parapet,  at  which  time  the  column 
on  the  beach  should  also  start ;  that  I  did  not  approve  of  the 
formation  the  Navy  seemed  inclined  to  make,  and  feared  the 
result  would  not  be  satisfactory.  He  replied,  "  I  am  sorry 
Army  officers  find  so  much  fault  with  the  Navy.  We  are  try- 
ing to  help  them  on  their  own  ground,  and  they  ought  to  be 
satisfied."  I  answered,  "  You  misunderstand  me.  We  want 
you  very  much,  both  your  guns  on  the  ships  and  your  men  on 
the  shore.  I  speak  as  a  landsman  about  operations  on  land  — 
I  would  not  criticise  nautical  matters.  Your  men  are  too  com- 
pactly formed  —  your  front  is  too  narrow  for  the  depth  of  your 


312  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

column.  To  go  into  action  as  your  men  are  now  formed  places 
you  under  a  great  disadvantage.  You  should  hold  back  your 
main  body  until  your  advanced  line  gets  a  foothold  on  the  fort. 
If  you  go  forward  as  you  are  you  will  be  fearfully  punished,  and 
the  only  good  your  column  will  do  us  will  be  to  receive  the  fire 
which  otherwise  would  come  to  our  lines.  I  fully  understand 
the  great  advantage  the  troops  will  derive  from  this  movement 
of  the  Navy,  but  hesitate  to  commend  it  when  I  think  of  the 
heavy  loss  they  must  sustain  in  making  it  in  the  formation  you 
have  adopted."  The  officer  left,  assuring  me  that  the  Navy 
would  do  its  part  and  merit  approval  whether  the  Army  gave  it 
or  not. 

Two  thousand  men  from  the  Navy,  from  sixty  ships,  unac- 
quainted one  with  another  or  with  the  service  they  were  to 
undertake,  were  brought  together  on  the  beach  to  perform  a 
most  hazardous  work.  The  number  of  officers  was  small  — 
entirely  too  few  for  the  number  of  men  engaged.  As  before 
stated,  the  force  was  too  compact.  The  first  line  should  have 
been  longer  and  thinner,  and  the  main  body  kept  out  of  the  fire 
until  the  first  line  had  reached  the  fort.  Such  a  plan  requires 
good  men  —  veterans  ;  it  is,  however,  the  way  to  assault  fortifi- 
cations with  the  least  loss  of  life,  almost  the  only  plan  by  which 
to  achieve  success. 

Before  advancing  to  the  first  line  every  officer  and  man  had 
been  instructed  as  to  his  movements  and  the  order  in  which 
they  would  take  place,  and  that  the  point  of  attack  would  be 
between  the  first  and  second  traverses. 

Just  before  the  preliminary  movements  were  begun  Captain 
A.  G.  Lawrence,  of  General  Ames's  staff,  came  to  me  and  asked 
if  he  could  go  with  my  brigade.  I  replied  that  he  could  if  he 
would  not  interfere  with  its  movements,  and  sent  him  to  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  F.  X.  Meyer,  commanding  the  1 1 7th  New  York, 
at  the  right  of  the  line.  Captain  Lawrence  understood  that  I 
was  not  under  the  command  of  his  chief,  and  that  he  could  not 
accompany  my  brigade  without  my  permission.     He  did  not  go 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT  FISHER  313 

as  the  representative  of  another,  nor  did  he  make  the  slightest 
attempt  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  men.  He  fell  at  the 
stockade,  seriously  wounded,  the  victim  of  a  valor  which  he  con- 
spicuously exhibited  in  every  battle  in  which  he  participated. 

The  preliminary  advances  were  made  in  a  succession  of  thin 
lines,  number  one  of  the  first  line  going  forward  to  a  rifle  pit, 
followed  by  number  two  ;  the  rear  rank  advancing  in  the  same 
manner.  By  this  method  only  one-fourth  of  the  line  was  ex- 
posed to  the  enemy's  fire. 

After  the  first  advance  Captain  Keeler,  of  the  division  staff, 
who  was  near  the  right  of  my  line,  called  out,  "  General  Ames 
says  the  time  for  the  assault  has  come."  I  replied,  "  I  shall 
obey  the  orders  of  General  Terry,  who  understands  that  the 
advance  depends  upon  the  fire  of  the  Navy  and  its  effect  upon 
the  garrison." 

Three  short  advances  were  made.  During  each  the  garrison 
came  to  the  parapet ;  when  the  line  halted  it  returned  to  the 
bomb-proofs,  each  time  remaining  longer  on  the  parapet  and 
suffering  greater  damage  from  the  naval  fire.  When  the  enemy 
seemed  determined  to  remain  on  the  parapet  the  final  rush 
was  made.  I  arose  from  the  middle  of  the  line  and  called 
out  "Forward,"  advancing  as  I  arose  from  the  ground.  Each 
officer  and  man  had  been  instructed  to  advance  as  he  got  up, 
and  to  go  forward  in  silence.  Cheering  was  positively  for- 
bidden, the  object  being  to  keep  the  men  from  expending  their 
wind  needlessly,  as  it  was  all  important  to  save  it  for  the  final 
rush  up  the  parapet.  We  were  fifteen  paces  to  the  front  before 
we  reached  the  usual  height  of  a  running  man,  which  is  about 
one-third  less  than  the  height  when  standing.  The  result  of 
this  movement  was  to  cause  the  first  volley  to  pass  over  our 
heads,  doing  but  little  damage.  Had  the  order  been  given, 
"  Attention,  first  battalion,  guide  right,  second,  third  and  fourth 
battalions  oblique  to  the  right,"  many  in  the  line  would  have 
been  shot  down  before  a  start  was  made. 

The  naval  fire  had  made  many  openings  in  the  stockade,  but 


314  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

not  enough  to  allow  speedy  passage  through  it.  One  hundred 
axes  which  had  been  distributed  in  the  brigade  were  vigorously- 
used,  under  a  galling  fire,  in  making  openings  for  the  men. 
The  first  forty  or  fifty  through  the  stockade  climbed  up  the 
parapet  and  met  the  enemy  between  the  first  and  second  trav- 
erses. In  this  space  there  were  two  Columbiads,  one  disabled, 
the  enemy  loading  the  other.  The  charge  had  been  sent  home, 
but  the  ramrod  not  withdrawn,  when  we  overpowered  the  gun- 
ners. The  man  at  the  breech  put  out  his  hand  with  a  primer 
to  discharge  the  piece,  after  his  surrender  had  been  demanded. 
A  sharp  blow  from  a  sabre  on  his  outstretched  hand  quickly  dis- 
suaded him,  and  the  charge  remained  until  the  captors  had 
leisure  to  withdraw  it. 

The  first  battle-flag  to  come  up  was  a  marker  of  the  1 1 7th 
New  York,  which  was  promptly  placed  on  the  second  traverse. 
Its  right  to  remain  there  was  tested  in  a  hand  to  hand  contest 
with  swords  and  bayonets,  in  which  the  Yankees'  won. 

We  then  went  down  to  the  floor  of  the  fort  and  secured  the 
men  serving  a  Napoleon  gun  at  the  gate,  and  a  number  of  in- 
fantry posted  at  the  stockade  west  of  the  gate.  These  men 
were  sent  to  the  rear  without  escort.  Their  capture  removed 
the  chief  obstacle  to  an  approach  by  the  road.  At  this  time 
the 'Second  Brigade  entered  the  fort,  some  through  the  gate, 
and  others  over  the  parapet.  Just  before  returning  to  the  para- 
pet I  saw  General  Ames  advancing  from  the  gate,  through  which 
he  had  apparently  entered  the  fort.  He  requested  Adjutant 
Roys,  117th  New  York,  to  take  a  number  of  prisoners  then 
coming  out  of  the  left  bomb-proof,  to  General  Terry,  with  his 
compliments.  I  directed  Adjutant  Roys  to  return  to  the  para- 
pet, where  he  could  be  better  employed  than  in  escorting  pris- 
oners to  the  rear.  He  obeyed  my  order,  and  rendered  most 
efficient  service  in  the  front  line  throughout  the  day.  Upon 
reaching  the  parapet  I  found  that  a  large  number  of  my  brigade 
had  succeeded  in  getting  through  the  stockade,  and  were  advan- 
cing to  the  place  first  gotten  possession  of,  where  they  were 
being  rapidly  joined  by  men  of  the  Second  Brigade. 


THE   CAPTURE    OF    FORT   FISHER  315 

At  the  time  we  made  the  grand  rush  for  the  left  of  the  para- 
pet, the  naval  column  moved  in  mass  upon  the  sea  bastion. 
The  enemy,  believing  this  to  be  the  main  attack,  turned  upon 
them  all  the  guns  which  could  sweep  the  beach,  and  massed 
more  than  half  of  his  infantry  behind  the  right  of  the  parapet 
to  repel  the  attack.  Colonel  Lamb  conducted  this  defence  of 
the  sea  bastion  in  person.  The  enemy's  fire  upon  the  naval 
column  was  terribly  effective,  spreading  death  and  disorder. 
Except  a  few,  who  reached  the  stockade,  those  not  disabled  soon 
retired. 

General  Whiting  at  this  time  occupied  a  position  on  the 
parapet  midway  between  the  sea  bastion  and  the  sally-port. 
The  repulse  of  the  naval  column  caused  the  troops  under 
Colonel  Lamb  and  General  Whiting  to  cheer  vigorously,  the 
cheers  being  heard  above  the  roar  of  the  cannon  ;  but  their 
exultation  was  short,  for,  upon  looking  to  the  west,  they  saw 
two  U.  S.  flags  on  the  left  of  the  parapet,  —  their  comrades 
unable  to  remove  them.  General  Whiting  hurried  with  the 
troops  near  him  to  the  left  of  the  line,  and  joined  in  the  contest 
which  we  made  for  the  third  traverse.  While  in  this  hand  to 
hand  conflict  he  received  a  mortal  wound,  and  was  carried  to  a 
bomb-proof,  whence  he  encouraged  his  men  to  continue  the  de- 
fence. Colonel  Pennypacker,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade, 
was  severely  wounded  while  placing  the  colors  of  his  regiment 
on  this  traverse,  and  Colonel  Moore,  203rd  Pennsylvania,  was 
killed  while  advancing  with  the  colors  of  his  regiment  to  the 
same  position.  Lieut.  Colonel  Burney  and  Major  Jones,  142nd 
New  York,  were  wounded  here,  but  soon  after  re-entered  the 
contest.  Here  Captain  Thomas,  117th  New  York,  was  killed. 
Lieut.  Colonel  Meyer  and  Major  Bagg,  117th  New  York,  al- 
though each  wounded,  and  many  officers  of  the  Second  Brigade 
whose  names  I  cannot  give,  came  to  the  front  and  joined  in  the 
contest  until  our  possession  of  the  traverse  was  undisputed. 
Our  killed  and  wounded  on  the  parapet  impeded  our  advance  to 
the  fourth  traverse  so  that  we  were  scarcely  able  to  go  forward 


316  CIVIL  WAR    PAPERS 

without  treading  upon  them.  Colonel  Lamb  came  forward  with 
troops  to  meet  us  at  the  fourth  traverse,  bringing  into  action  a 
larger  number  than  we  had  met  at  the  third.  Our  numbers 
were  also  increased  by  those  who  joined  us  as  rapidly  as  they 
came  into  the  fort.  The  struggle  for  this  traverse  was  the 
hottest  and  most  prolonged  single  contest  of  the  day.  The  loss 
of  life  was  great  on  both  sides.  The  killed  and  wounded  were 
set  aside  to  make  room  for  comrades  who  came  impetuously  for- 
ward to  support  their  respective  sides.  In  this  contest  Colonel 
Lamb  was  seriously  wounded,  and  taken  to  the  same  bombrproof 
occupied  by  General  Whiting,  from  which  place  he  directed  his 
subordinates  to  make  every  resistance  to  our  advance  ;  but  our 
success  in  this  fearful  struggle  had  turned  the  tide,  their 
defence  became  less  spirited  and  effective,  and  each  succeeding 
traverse  was  taken  with  less  difficulty. 

The  naval  fire  throughout  the  day  had  been  delivered  with 
singular  accuracy,  at  the  rate  of  two  or  three  shells  per  second, 
in  front  of  the  assaulting  forces  ;  but  at  the  fifth  traverse  a  shot 
went  wide  of  its  mark  and  killed  or  disabled  all  but  four  men  in 
our  front  line.  Fearing  that  a  slackening  of  our  fire  would  in- 
vite a  countercharge,  I  myself  discharged  the  guns  of  the  killed 
and  disabled  men  until  reinforcements  were  brought  forward. 
A  sudden  emergency  compelled  this  action.  It  was  not  done  to 
encourage  the  soldiers  • — no  theatrical  efforts  were  needed  to 
quicken  their  zeal.  Men  unable  to  stand  and  fire  their  pieces 
handed  up  the  guns  of  their  dead  and  helpless  comrades,  and 
when  given  back  reloaded  them  again  and  again,  exhibiting  a 
frenzied  zeal  and  unselfish  devotion,  that,  seemingly,  nothing  but 
death  could  chill. 

While  we  were  capturing  the  traverses,  others  on  the  floor 
of  the  fort  fought  the  enemy  in  bomb-proofs  and  behind  obstruc- 
tions near  the  parapet,  keeping  pace  with  us.  Lieut.  Colonel 
Lyman,  203rd  Pennsylvania,  was  killed  while  actively  urging  this 
line  forward.  Several  company  officers  were  in  this  detachment, 
and  vigorously  conducted  these  operations  after  his  death,  among 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT  FISHER  317 

them  Captain  William  H.  Walling,  142nd  New  York  Volunteers, 
who,  on  the  first  expedition,  had  captured  the  garrison  flag  of 
Fort  Fisher.  Captain  R.  D.  Morehouse,  142nd  New  York 
Volunteers,  in  charge  of  a  party,  captured  a  large  number  of 
Confederates  in  the  sally-port,  from  which  they  had  energetically 
opposed  the  advance  of  our  forces  on  the  floor  of  the  fort ;  but 
our  progress  on  the  parapet  rendered  their  position  untenable, 
and,  by  a  skilful  movement,  he  captured  them  before  they  could 
retire  to  other  defences.  His  skill  and  bravery  were  as  con- 
spicuous then  as  his  modest  dignity  is  noticeable  among  his  com- 
panions of  the  Legion.  This  capture  was  considered  by  the 
Confederates  a  dishonorable  surrender.  They  did  not  know 
then  that  these  men  had  been  compelled  to  surrender,  and  had 
only  put  up  a  white  flag  when  retreat  was  impossible.  Major 
William  J.  Sanders  reports  this  incident  in  the  following  language: 
"  General  Whiting,  although  wounded,  was  still  directing,  as  far 
as  possible,  the  movements  of  his  small  force,  when  Major  Riley 
rushed  in  and  reported  the  astonishing  fact  that  an  officer,  hav- 
ing put  his  handkerchief  on  a  ramrod  whilst  he  was  temporarily 
in  another  portion  of  his  command,  had  surrendered  three 
hundred  of  his  men  and  admitted  a  regiment  into  the  galleries 
of  the  sally-port  on  the  land-face." 

Progress  was  more  easily  and  steadily  made  until  we  gained 
possession  of  the  seventh  traverse  at  4.45  p.m.,  where  it  was 
found  that  our  best  marksmen  could  drive  the  gunners  from 
the  Columbiad  on  the  sea  bastion,  with  which  gun  the  enemy 
had  enfiladed  the  ditch  and  given  the  assailants  more  trouble 
than  with  any  other  piece  in  the  fort.  When  it  was  discovered 
that  this  gun  could  be  silenced,  the  project  of  marching  up  the 
ditch  and  capturing  the  sea  bastion  was  decided  upon,  and  men 
at  the  west  end  of  the  fort  were  summoned  to  undertake  it.  I 
sent  Corporal  Jones,  of  the  color  guard  of  the  1 17th  New  York, 
to  the  west  end  of  the  fort  to  bring  men  forward.  He  came 
back,  and  stated  that  General  Ames  directed  him  to  return  and 
say  that  men  could  not  be  sent,  but  spades  to  fortify  would  be 


318  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

furnished.  My  orderly,  A.  D.  Knight,  was  next  sent  to  obtain 
men,  and  directed  to  state  the  object  of  the  movement  to  be 
made.  He  soon  returned,  and  stated  that  General  Ames  had 
ordered  him  to  say  that  the  men  were  exhausted,  and  no  further 
advance  would  be  attempted  until  reinforcements  arrived  in 
the  morning ;  that  we  should  hold  the  ground  occupied,  if 
possible,  and  that  intrenching  tools  would  be  sent  to  us.  I 
directed  Orderly  Knight  to  go  back  and  request  officers  under 
my  rank  to  collect  men  and  bring  them  forward,  so  that  the 
attack  could  be  made  before  dark  ;  to  say  that  the  resistance  of 
the  enemy  was  less  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  and  that 
the  capture  of  the  bastion  would  compel  an  early  surrender. 
Knight  soon  returned  with  an  armful  of  spades  which  General 
Ames  had  ordered  him  to  carry  to  me  that  I  might  fortify  and 
hold  our  position  until  fresh  troops  came  into  the  fort.  I  threw 
the  spades  over  the  traverse  to  the  Confederates.  Being  con- 
vinced that  General  Ames  intended  to  suspend  operations  until 
reinforcements  came  in,  I  directed  Silas  W.  Kempton,  Mate 
U.  S.  Navy,  who  reported  to  me  early  in  the  engagement  and 
volunteered  to  serve  in  whatever  capacity  he  might  be  useful, 
to  go,  for  the  second  time,  to  General  Terry,  to  urge  him  to 
have  the  troops  then  engaged  in  throwing  up  fortifications  in 
rear  of  the  left  end  of  the  parapet  to  join  in  a  general  advance, 
and  take  possession  of  the  fort  before  reinforcements  could  be 
sent  in  to  the  enemy.  I  instructed  him  to  state  that  the  enemy 
were  offering  slight  resistance,  and  that  a  bold  push  would 
secure  a  victory  already  substantially  won.  This  young  sailor 
had  been  previously  sent  to  General  Terry,  after  we  had  won 
possession  of  the  fourth  traverse,  to  ask  him  to  have  the  naval 
fire  in  front  of  our  advancing  lines  increased,  if  possible,  and  to 
have  the  fuses  cut  shorter,  so  as  to  cause  the  explosion  of 
the  shells  nearer  the  parapet.  Many  passed  beyond  the  fort, 
and  were  lost  by  exploding  in  the  marsh  and  river.  The  zeal 
and  intelligence  of  Mr.  Kempton  commanded  my  warmest 
admiration. 


THE    CAPTURE   OF   FORT   FISHER  319 

I  then  directed  Captain  David  B.  Magill,  117th  New  York, 
to  take  the  next  traverse  with  the  first  men  who  should  come 
up,  and  went  to  the  west  end  of  the  parapet  and  to  the  floor  of 
the  fort  in  rear  of  it,  to  obtain  men  to  march  up  the  ditch  to 
the  sea  bastion.  While  collecting  them  on  the  floor  of  the  fort 
in  rear  of  the  first  and  second  traverses,  General  Ames  addressed 
me,  for  the  first  time  since  the  movement  on  the  fort  had 
begun,  and  said,  "  I  have  two  or  three  times  sent  you  word  to 
fortify  your  position  and  hold  it  until  reinforcements  can  be 
sent  to  aid  us  ;  the  men  are  exhausted,  and  I  will  not  order 
them  to  go  forward."  I  directed  his  attention  to  two  steam- 
boats in  the  Cape  Fear  River,  loaded  with  Confederate  troops, 
waiting  for  darkness  to  enable  them  to  land,  which  they  could 
not  do  while  it  was  light,  because  of  the  naval  fire,  and  said, 
"  Should  they  succeed  in  landing  they  may  be  able  to  drive  us 
out  ;  therefore,  the  fort  should  be  captured  before  fresh  troops 
come  to  the  enemy."  I  informed  him  that  the  garrison  was 
resisting  with  less  spirit  than  earlier  in  the  day,  and  asserted 
that  complete  victory  was  within  our  grasp  if  we  aroused  our- 
selves and  pushed  the  advantage  we  surely  had,  and  that  I 
intended  to  conduct  the  movement  up  the  ditch  to  the  sea 
bastion  if  I  could  get  but  fifty  men.  Several  said,  "  We  will 
go."  At  this  time  the  sun  was  just  disappearing,  at  5.1 5^  p.m., 
—  as  stated  by  the  Navy  Department,  two  hours  and  five 
minutes  from  the  opening  of  the  battle. 

While  the  volunteers  were  assembling  I  went  further  into 
the  fort  and  had  ascended  a  magazine  or  sand  dune  for  the 
purpose  of  looking  into  the  angle  of  the  bastion  I  intended  to 
attack,  when  I  was  struck  and  disabled  by  two  fragments  of  a 
shell,  one  destroying  the  left  eye,  and  the  other  carrying  away 
a  portion  of  the  bone  at  the  base  of  the  brain.  I  was  uncon- 
scious for  several  hours. 

From  official  and  other  trustworthy  sources  it  is  shown  that 
after  sundown  no  special  efforts  were  made  to  advance  our 
lines,  except  the  capture  of  an  additional  traverse  by  the  troops 


320  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

left  under  command  of  Captain  Magill  when  I  started  out  to 
collect  men  to  go  up  the  ditch.  About  8  o'clock  a  regiment 
of  colored  troops  from  General  Paine's  line  was  sent  to  General 
Ames  to  assist  in  taking  possession  of  the  fort.  He  directed 
them  to  stack  arms  outside  the  fort  and  join  the  men  in  the 
rear  of  the  left  end  of  the  parapet  in  throwing  up  breastworks 
to  protect  the  assailants  from  a  counter-charge  by  the  garrison. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  the  sailors  and  marines  were  withdrawn 
from  the  beach  and  sent  to  relieve  Abbott's  brigade,  which  was 
immediately  sent  down  to  the  fort.  The  3rd  New  Hampshire 
was  placed  on  the  right  of  Abbott's  brigade,  and  when  Captain 
Trickey,  in  command  of  it,  was  directed  by  General  Abbott  to 
take  the  traverse  on  that  part  of  the  parapet  where  the  greatest 
resistance  was  expected  to  be  made,  the  captain  called  his 
attention  to  the  fact  that  he  had  less  than  eighty  men  in  his 
command,  and  that  a  greater  number  might  be  needed  to  carry 
the  traverses.  General  Abbott  informed  him  he'  would  be 
supported,  and  that  his  regiment  was  specially  named  to  him  by 
General  Terry  for  that  duty.  The  fact  that  the  regiment  was 
armed  with  repeating  rifles  may  have  influenced  General  Terry 
in  making  the  selection.  The  order  for  the  placing  of  the 
3rd  New  Hampshire  in  Abbott's  brigade,  as  stated  to  me  by  its 
commander,  shows  that  General  Terry  kept  in  close  touch  with 
the  several  brigades,  and  gave  personal  attention  to  their  move- 
ments throughout  the  battle.  When  Abbott's  brigade  reached 
the  unoccupied  portion  of  the  parapet  the  enemy  received  it 
with  a  volley,  but  not  heavy  enough  to  check  its  progress.  It 
marched  over  the  parapet,  across  the  floor  of  the  fort,  parallel 
to  the  sea-face,  and  southward  to  Battery  Buchanan,  where  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Fisher  was  found,  unarmed  and  demoralized. 
These  operations  of  Abbott's  brigade  were  successfully  carried 
out  with  the  loss  of  four  men  killed  and  twenty-three  wounded. 
As  soon  as  it  was  dark  General  Whiting  and  Colonel  Lamb 
had  been  carried  to  Battery  Buchanan,  the  former  mortally  and 
the  latter  seriously  wounded.     It  was  proposed  to  send  them 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT  FISHER  321 

across  the  river  in  small  boats,  as  many  had  been,  but  they  de- 
termined to  remain  and  share  the  fate  of  the  garrison. 

The  troops  entered  the  fort  without  hesitation,  and  vied  one 
with  another,  officers  and  men  alike,  for  possession  of  the  work. 
The  loss  in  the  early  part  of  the  engagement  of  Colonel  Bell, 
commanding  Third  Brigade,  and  Colonel  Smith,  112th  New 
York,  both  mortally  wounded  before  reaching  the  work,  and  of 
Colonel  Moore,  killed  soon  after  mounting  the  parapet,  was 
sorely  felt  throughout  the  day.  They  were  soldiers  of  marked 
ability,  veterans  who  had  won  distinction  in  every  campaign  in 
which  the  army  to  which  they  belonged  had  been  engaged. 
Colonel  Pennypacker,  commanding  Second  Brigade,  was  seri- 
ously wounded  while  placing  the  colors  of  his  regiment  on  the 
third  traverse.  This  distinguished  officer  had  put  his  brigade 
into  position  and  given  it  an  impulse  which  continued  through- 
out the  day.  The  loss  of  no  officer  could  have  been  greater. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  hour  few  officers  could  have  been  found 
not  disabled  or  bearing  wounds  that  would  have  justified  their 
retirement  from  an  ordinary  engagement,  and  a  suspension  of 
hostilities  would  have  followed  had  not  the  troops  been  of  the 
highest  grade.  Nine-tenths  of  them  were  veterans  who  had 
served  in  the  campaigns  in  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  and  had 
fought  in  every  battle  from  Cold  Harbor  to  the  last  battle  in  the 
campaign  before  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  There  was  not  an 
officer  or  man  in  the  division  who  did  not  merit  the  highest 
commendation  for  unyielding  persistency,  courage,  and  devotion. 

While  the  First  and  Second  Brigades  were  the  first  to  enter 
the  fort,  and  contended  together  without  distinction  for  posses- 
sion of  the  parapet,  it  is  not  the  intention  to  claim  that  one 
brigade  was  superior.  Circumstances  to  a  large  degree,  no 
doubt,  influenced  the  selection  as  to  the  order  in  which  the 
troops  attacked  the  fort.  The  First  Brigade  had  been  near  it 
on  the  first  expedition,  had  taken  its  flag  and  a  battalion  of 
prisoners,  and  thoroughly  believed  that  it  could  have  been 
captured  then.     The  knowledge  of  this  fact  undoubtedly  had 


322  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

much  weight  in  influencing  the  commanding  general  to  select 
that  brigade  to  lead  the  assaulting  forces.  Each  brigade  took 
the  position  assigned  to  it,  and  performed  its  duties  in  a  most 
courageous  and  efficient  manner. 

The  crisis  was  passed  soon  after  four  o'clock,  and  success 
assured  when  the  First  and  Second  Brigades  had  mounted  the 
parapet  and  demonstrated  their  ability  not  only  to  hold  their 
ground,  but  to  make  steady  progress  from  traverse  to  traverse. 
Had  Ames  and  Curtis  both  been  killed  or  disabled  at  the  time 
Pennypacker  was  wounded,  the  battle  would  have  proceeded 
successfully  under  the  command  of  field  and  company  officers. 
When  the  battle  was  well  begun  skill  and  generalship  consisted  in 
physical  blows,  and  to  every  one  who  struck  them  honor  is  due. 

Admiral  Porter  wanted  success  no  less  than  General  Terry, 
and  was  ready  to  take  any  steps  in  the  line  of  his  profession  to 
win  it.  He  knew,  as  all  did,  that  a  naval  column  would  divert 
the  garrison,  and  asked  the  navy  to  furnish  men  to'  form  it. 
In  pursuit  of  victory  desperate  chances  are  often  taken.  Never 
did  men  undertake  a  more  difficult  or  hazardous  task,  and  never 
did  men  offer  themselves  in  their  country's  service  with  more 
zeal,  courage  or  unselfish  devotion  than  did  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  Navy,  and  the  Marines,  on  the  beach  at  Fort  Fisher. 
Their  action  contributed  to  the  progress  of  the  army  —  whether 
the  gain  justified  the  losses  we  shall  never  know.  The  naval 
column  was  important  as  a  diversion,  but  its  value  was  slight  in 
comparison  with  the  fire  of  the  six  hundred  guns  trained  on  the 
fort.  The  fleet  maintained  an  uninterrupted  fire  for  two  days, 
exceeding  in  effectiveness  any  bombardment  recorded  in  the 
annals  of  war.  To  Admiral  Porter's  fleet  the  army  was  in- 
debted for  an  uncontested  landing,  for  an  uninterrupted  approach 
to  within  charging  distance  of  the  fort,  and  to  its  well  directed 
fire  in  front  of  the  assaulting  forces,  for  a  success  which,  with- 
out the  Navy's  aid,  would  have  been  impossible. 

It  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  refer  to  the  enemy  and  their 
defence  of  the  fort. 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT  FISHER  323 

The  constant  fire  of  the  Navy  for  two  days  deprived  the 
garrison  of  opportunity  to  rest  or  prepare  food.  While  they 
suffered  but  little  from  this  fire  until  brought  out  of  their  bomb- 
proofs  to  contest  the  advance  of  the  assaulting  forces,  they  then 
came  under  the  hottest  fire  men  ever  encountered.  Colonel 
Lamb  skillfully  conducted  the  defence,  aided  by  General  Whit- 
ing, who  had  volunteered  his  services  on  entering  the  fort. 
They  protected  their  men  until  the  decisive  moment,  and  then 
led  them  with  conspicuous  gallantry. 

The  left  of  the  parapet  was  in  charge  of  a  junior  officer 
whose  mistake,  that  of  a  moment  only,  was  in  failing  to  mount 
the  parapet  and  contest  our  advance  from  the  ditch.  The  men 
serving  the  piece  of  artillery  covering  the  road,  west  of  the  para- 
pet, were  so  intent  in  performing  their  duty  that  they  were  un- 
conscious of  our  approach  until  ordered  to  surrender  by  men  of 
the  1 1 7th  New  York,  who  went  down  from  the  parapet  after 
capturing  the  second  traverse. 

General  Bragg,  in  his  report  on  the  capture  of  the  fort,  says 
of  our  assaulting  line  : 

"  His  army  column,  preceded  by  a  single  regiment,  ap- 
proached along  the  river  and  entered  the  work  on  that  flank 
almost  unopposed." 

This  does  a  great  injustice  to  the  men  guarding  the  road. 
In  fact  they  made  it  fatal  to  approach  by  the  road  ;  and  not 
until  their  capture,  in  active  defence  of  the  work,  was  the  road 
made  a  safer  line  of  approach  than  over  the  parapet.  The  Con- 
federate garrison  of  Fort  Fisher  might  well  resent  this  asper- 
sion on  their  most  stubborn  defence,  and  justly  complain  of  the 
indifference  of  General  Bragg,  who  had  six  thousand  men  within 
striking  distance  of  our  defensive  line  —  more  than  twice  the 
number  of  men  holding  the  line  —  in  not  vigorously  attacking 
it.  General  Bragg  reported  to  General  Lee  "That  at  4  p.m., 
when  the  enemy's  infantry  advanced  to  the  assault,  our  troops 
were  making  a  heavy  demonstration  against  the  enemy's  rear." 
Although  he  expended  a  large  amount  of  ammunition  in  making 


324  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

this  so-called  "heavy  demonstration,"  nevertheless  General 
Paine's  line  was  maintained  without  the  loss  or  injury  of  a  single 
Union  soldier. 

I  have  said  that  the  enemy  plainly  showed  signs  of  weaken- 
ing before  5  p.m.,  and  that  full  possession  of  the  fort  only 
awaited  the  advance  of  the  Federal  troops.  This  statement  is 
supported  by  the  reports  of  Confederate  officers. 

In  his  report  General  Whiting  says  : 

"  The  fall  both  of  the  general  and  the  colonel  commanding 
the  fort,  one  about  4  and  the  other  about  4.30  p.m.,  had  a  per- 
ceptible effect  upon  the  men,  and  no  doubt  hastened  greatly  the 
result ;  but  we  were  overpowered,  and  no  skill  or  gallantry  could 
have  saved  the  place,  after  he  effected  a  lodgment,  except  attack 
in  the  rear." 

General  Colquitt,  who  had  been  ordered,  late  in  the  after- 
noon, to  take  command  of  the  fort,  reported  to  General  Bragg 
the  condition  of  affairs  he  found  on  landing  on  Federal  Point 
between  9  and  10  p.m. 

"We  landed,  therefore,  four  hundred  or  five  hundred  yards 
from  Battery  Buchanan,  between  the  Battery  and  Fort  Fisher. 
I  was  not  hailed,  and  did  not  see  a  sentinel  or  picket.  A  short 
distance  from  the  point  of  landing  I  saw  a  shanty  with  several 
negroes  and  one  or  two  white  men  in  it.  They  reported  that 
Fisher  was  taken,  which,  as  I  distrusted,  I  required  one  of  them 
to  come  out  and  go  with  me  as  guide.  I  was  about  starting 
when  an  officer,  representing  himself  as  Captain  Munn,  with  a 
dozen  or  fifteen  men,  without  arms,  came  up.  These  I  took  for 
a  fatigue  detail,  until  the  captain  informed  me  the  fort  was 
evacuated ;  that  he  had  just  come  from  it,  and  that  General 
Whiting  and  Colonel  Lamb  were  already  at  Battery  Buchanan. 
.  .  .  Meeting  an  officer,  he  said  he  would  carry  me  to  Colonel 
Lamb,  who  was  wounded.  I  found  the  colonel  prostrate  with 
a  wound,  which  he  thought,  however,  was  not  severe.  In  an- 
swer to  my  inquiry  whether  anything  more  could  be  done,  he 
replied  that  a  fresh  brigade  might  then  retake  the  fort.     I  told 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   FORT  FISHER  325 

him  there  was  no  brigade  with  me,  and  wished  to  know  of  him 
the  condition  of  the  men  who  had  escaped.  He  said  that  when 
he  was  wounded  everything  broke  up  in  consternation  and  was 
utterly  disorganized,  and  that  no  further  efforts  could  effect 
anything  with  the  resources  available." 

Lieutenant  Hugh  H.  Colquitt,  who  accompanied  General 
Colquitt  to  Battery  Buchanan,  in  his  report  says  : 

"  I  asked  an  officer,  the  coolest  man  I  saw,  at  what  hour  the 
enemy  got  into  the  fort.  He  replied,  about  two  hours  by  the 
sun.  '  What  in  the  world  have  you  been  doing  since  ? '  This 
he  answered  by  stating  that  he  had  been  fighting  in  the  fort 
ever  since,  until  dark,  when  the  garrison  commenced  leaving, 
and  he  presumed  all  had  left  by  that  time.  .  .  .  All  our  men 
were  in  a  state  of  panic  and  demoralization  ;  no  organization, 
no  guns,  nothing  but  confusion  and  dismay." 

"The  Abstract  From  Return  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces, 
Bvet.  Maj.  Gen.  Alfred  H.  Terry,  U.  S.  Army,  commanding, 
for  January  10,  1865,"  gives  the  aggregate  of  the  four  brigades 
engaged  in  reducing  the  fort,  five  days  before  the  assault, 
to  have  been  two  hundred  and  fifty-seven  officers  and  five  thou- 
sand one  hundred  and  seventy-two  men.  Of  this  number  prob- 
ably thirty-seven  hundred  took  part  in  the  assault,  and  at  9 
o'clock  p.m.  thirteen  hundred  men  under  Abbott  and  three 
hundred  colored  troops  entered  the  fort  substantially  unopposed, 
to  secure  a  victory  actually  won  four  hours  before.  There  are 
no  records  in  the  War  Department  giving  the  number  of  officers 
and  men  in  the  brigades  commanded  respectively  by  Curtis, 
Pennypacker  and  Bell,  or  the  number  of  men  taken  into  action. 
It  is  estimated  that  the  First  (Curtis')  Brigade  numbered  nine 
hundred  officers  and  men  ;  the  Second  ( Pennypacker' s),  seven- 
teen hundred  officers  and  men  ;  the  Third  (Bell's),  eleven  hun- 
dred officers  and  men ;  Abbott's  Second  Brigade,  thirteen 
hundred  officers  and  men. 

The  return  of  the  casualties  indicates  the  actual  resistance 
met  by  the  several  brigades,  which  I  give  in  the  order  they  re- 


326  CIVIL   WAR   PAPERS 

spectively  entered  the  fort.  Curtis'  brigade,  two  officers  and 
thirty-seven  men  killed ;  eighteen  officers  and  one  hundred  and 
sixty-six  men  wounded  ;  five  missing.  25.33  per  cent.  Penny- 
packer's  brigade,  six  officers  and  forty-five  men  killed ;  six  offi- 
cers and  two  hundred  and  eleven  men  wounded ;  two  missing. 
16.47  Per  cent.  Bell's  brigade,  two  officers  and  fourteen  men 
killed  ;  six  officers  and  ninety-one  men  wounded ;  two  missing. 
10.04  Per  cent.  Abbott's  brigade,  four  men  killed  ;  two  officers 
and  twenty-one  men  wounded  ;  four  missing.  2.33  per  cent. 
The  missing  includes  those  injured  beyond  recognition,  and 
those  buried  in  the  sand  by  the  explosion  of  a  magazine  after 
the  capture. 

In  bestowing  honors  for  the  victory  at  Fort  Fisher  we 
should  prominently  mention  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  North  Atlantic  blockading  squadron, 
who,  for  three  years,  had  continually  urged  the  sending  of  an 
army  force  to  join  the  navy  in  an  expedition  to  reduce  the  de- 
fences at  the  mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear  River.  Nor  should  we 
neglect  prominently  to  associate  General  Grant  with  its  capture. 
He  organized  the  military  force,  and  in  spite  of  the  first  failure 
adhered  to  his  purpose  with  unyielding  persistency  until  the 
end  was  accomplished.  The  skill  and  labors  of  Admiral  Porter 
and  General  Terry  were  fully  acknowledged  by  the  Administra- 
tion and  Congress,  which  all  serving  under  them  heartily  approve. 

Whatever  may  be  the  opinion  of  military  men  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  employing  troops  in  throwing  up  breastworks  in- 
side the  fort  —  a  greater  number  of  men  than  were  engaged 
with  the  enemy  in  close  action  on  the  parapet  and  the  floor  of 
the  fort  near  the  parapet  —  instead  of  sending  them  across  the 
floor  of  the  fort  to  the  sea-face,  which  movement  would  have 
ended  the  contest  an  hour  before  sunset,  certain  it  is  all  will 
acknowledge  that  General  Ames,  under  whose  directions  these 
engineering  operations  were  carried  on,  bore  himself  with  cool- 
ness and  courage,  as  he  did  in  his  first  battle,  when  he  won  a 
Congressional  Medal  of  Honor  for  personal  bravery. 


THE    CAPTURE    OF  FORT   FISHER  327 

The  services  of  the  gentlemen  who  went  on  both  expeditions 
in  an  advisory  capacity,  although  on  the  first  the  most  impor- 
tant action  —  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the  beach  — 
was  determined  upon  without  his  opinion  being  asked,  were 
briefly  stated  by  General  Terry  : 

"  To  Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  C.  B.  Comstock,  Aide-de-Camp  on  the  staff  of  the 
Lieutenant  General,  I  am  under  the  deepest  obligations.  At  every  step  of  our 
progress  I  received  from  him  the  most  valuable  assistance.  For  the  final  success 
of  our  part  of  the  operations  the  country  is  more  indebted  to  him  than  to  me." 

It  would  be  unjust,  as  it  would  be  ungenerous,  to  withhold 
from  the  field  and  company  officers  the  warmest  praise  for  their 
watchfulness  in  detecting  every  advantage  afforded  by  the 
enemy,  for  their  irresistible  impetuosity  and  valor,  which  over- 
came obstacles  as  great  as  human  skill  and  stubborn  devotion 
could  create,  or  to  fail  to  gratefully  acknowledge  the  services  of 
the  men  in  the  ranks.  Their  steadiness,  fortitude  and  bravery 
were  surpassed  by  no  one  exercising  command  over  them. 
Certainly  our  great  commander  did  not  neglect  to  commend 
every  member  of  the  military  force  composing  the  expedition, 
irrespective  of  rank  or  grade,  in  one  of  the  most  extraordinary 
documents  ever  filed  with  the  archives  of  the  War  Department, 
wherein  he  recommended  their  commander  for  a  high  position 
in  the  regular  army,  based  solely  on  their  services,  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  promotions  given  to  Terry,  Ames,  Pennypacker 
and  Curtis  in  acknowledgment  of  their  personal  services. 

City  Point,  VA.,/anua?y  17,  1865. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton, 

Secretary  of  War. 
As  a  substantial  recognition  of  the  bravery  of  both  officers  and  men  in  the 
capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  and  the  important  service  thereby  rendered  to  their 
country,  I  do  most  respectfully  recommend  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen.  Alfred  H.  Terry,  U.  S. 
Volunteers,  their  commanding  officer,  for  appointment  as  Brigadier  General  in  the 
Regular  Army. 

U.  S.  Grant, 

Lieutenant  General. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032743924 

FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 
THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


TYSON'S 
BOOK  SHOP 

119  Caesar  Mitch  BIdg. 

51  EMPIRE  ST. 
PROVIDENCE,  R,  I. 


